Introduction 1
The SeGond World War forced Canada to create modem and impressive defence research capabilities. The national application of science, industry, and technology towards military ends was an integral component of Allied victory over the Fascist powers of Europe and Imperial Japan. Canadian politicians, engineers, soldiers, and scientists organized their talents towards this end, and contributed to such projects as the proximity fuse, modern radar, and atomic weapons research, to name but three.
2 These efforts were primarily directed through two government bodies, the National Research Council (NRC) and the newly formed Department of Munitions and Supply (DMS). In six years of struggle, Canada emerged as a. first class defence research power, one that would parley these strengths into the technologically defined Cold War. 3 The historiography of this development is problematic to trace for three related reasons. First, defence research is scattered among many historical during the Second World War portfolio. An acclaimed engineer and engineering teacher with a photographic memory and incredible capacity for work, Howe was given the largest powers of any minister in the war, essentially free to create and control national agencies, and the freedom to do with it as he saw best. Howe excelled at the task. 8 Howe's energy and leadership was essential to Canada's success on the industrial front.
9
Stream I: Institutional and Popular Accounts, Government research institutions wrote the first works on wartime defence research to ensure their efforts were not forgotten. Such legacy works are characterized by generalized accounts of vast projects, complimented by technical data and photographs. While useful, they are uncritical and often brazenly so about the efforts of the organizations during the war.
The NRC War Years
The NRC published the first such work in 1946, with The War History of the Division of Biology. This monograph focused on food production, preparation, and refrigeration techniques, critical to British survival after the fall of France and during the Battle of the Atlantic. Other projects included research on biological indicators for war gas, finding natural resource substitutes for war supplies like rubber and alcohol, and developing the "tropicalization" of rations and equipment for Canada's aborted role in the Pacific War. It ends with the discussion of Canada's effort to feed a starving Europe in the aftermath of the war, including solving the problem of canning kosher foods for Europe's desperate Jewish population. 10 Two years later the NRC released its war history of the radio branch, responsible for developing radar. The short narrative tells of Britain's spring 1939 decision to include the dominions in its "RDF" (Radio Detection and Finding) efforts. The head of NRC's radio section, Dr. J.T. Henderson, represented Canada at the first of these meetings in London, and by the start of the war the NRC had, at the behest of President McNaughton, begun its work on radar development for the armed services. This history briefly describes the organization of the branch and its radio model shop section, relations with Munitions and Supply crown corporation Research Enterprise Limited, work done with University of Toronto, McGill, Queen's, and Western, and the various projects undertaken for the armed services.
! '
These institutional histories are helpful for basic understandings of the division's projects and management, but they provide no critical insight into the problems each division faced. They provide the reader with the basics of the organization's efforts that can, and should, be challenged as more scholarly work on the people, processes, and products associated with the NRC's war work is written.
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More rigorous histories of the NRG's war effort were planned, especially the Chemicals Division, which had consumed almost half of the NRC's labour and resources during the war. But the difficulty of translating the complex subject into readable prose confounded the authors of the era. Compounded by the general disinterest of many NRC scientists to take on historical work, the plan of more rigorous NRC histories on the war years would lie dormant for decades.
12
Similar development occurred in creating the official two-volume history of the Department of Munitions and Supply. Written over four years by department member J. de N. Kennedy, it catalogues the department's phenomenal growth under the stewardship of CD. Howe. 13 Defence production and defence research were intimately related throughout the war, and Kennedy's sweeping work catalogues the many research projects connected with the ministry's branches, crown corporations, and controls.
The DMS had two chief defence research branches. The first was the Army Engineering Design Branch, created 9 July 1941, tasked to keep up with changing technical demands in light of battlefield experience. It contained four directorates: Directorate of Signals Design, Directorate of Automotive Design, Directorate of Metallurgy, and Directorate of Tank Design. Contractors did most of the engineering and drafting. Automotive and tank design were of primarily US origin given the need for standardization of parts and US experience in this field. This branch also worked with the Ford Motor Company (Canada) and GM of Canada in the developmental stage to iron out problems before beginning mass production. The Directorate of Metallurgy started the nascent armour creation capability in Canada of armoured steel, working with the Ore Dressing and Metallurgical labs of thé Department of Mines and Resources. There was also an Automotive and Tank Production Branch and by 1941, Canada was the main source of mechanized transport in the British Empire. After the fall of France, tank design in Canada moved from piecemeal to complete construction, including the thinly armoured and soon obsolete Valentine tank, among others. These efforts pushed the nation to the limits of its technical infrastructure. The successful management of these research efforts is, alongside production, a large part of DMS's successful war work. 14 The second defence research unit was the Chemicals and Explosives Branch, deeply responsible for the ammunition program's success. Allied War Supplies Corporation, a crown corporation, was created to supervise the construction, management, and opération of chemical, explosive, and ammunition plants. The branch also maintained a Research and Investigations division, which primarily looked at alternative uses of natural resources in chemical explosives, such as using Canadian wood pulp instead of cotton linters as a source of cellulose for nitrocellulose manufacture. The branch managed most industry-critical resources, 15 Kennedy also highlights the projects developed in cooperation with the NRC, who largely provided initial research on projects while DMS worked on production methods. These joint ventures include, gun-laying radar (GL radar systems), the RDX super-explosive, No. 58 Wireless set, or "Walkie Talkie," polymers and plastics, optics, taking over the NRC's jet propulsion project in 1943, and more. Canada's atomic power projects at the Montreal Laboratory and Chalk River, as well as the takeover of Eldorado Co. as the chief uranium supplier in Canada, are also briefly covered. 16 But Kennedy's work suffers greatly from how it was written, and large parts of Canada's industrial front were left incomplete. 17 Leadership, the role of personalities, and the complex relationship between research and development and final production are mentioned but not scrutinized, compared, or evaluated. This history is what historian Reinhardt Ruurp classified as "company history," a project that cannot embarrass those it portrays because of its structure and intent; thus much of the story behind the story, the how and the why so crucial to historical analysis, remains hidden. 18 In part, Kennedy's work suffers from poor research and limited sources. It was based on project summations made by the organization during the war that he revised, though it is unclear when or where the revisions occurred. It also relied heavily on the booklet prepared by DMS's DirectorGeneral of the Publicity Branch, Rielle Thomson, entitled The Industrial Front. Parts of this pamphlet, he notes, were incorporated "with little or no change." 19 It was also a rushed and incomplete history. As Kennedy noted, By 1946 the majority of the personnel of the Department had returned to their peacetime occupations, the files were not easy to find and the Department of Reconstruction and Supply had taken over the remaining duties and functions of the Department of Munitions and Supply. For these and other reasons, it has been extremely difficult to piece together a comprehensive account of the work of some of the units of the Department and any attempt at documentation has been out of the question. I hope the reader will make generous allowances for the shortcomings of some of the chapters. 20 Kennedy's work, while not void of value, is merely a survey from a collection of surveys on the DMS's vast war projects, and not a rich, scholarly product. 21 By the 1960s, popular works on wartime science were being produced, for example, Scientists at War, an unofficial history of the NRC's war efforts by Wilfred Eggleston, a respected journalist and NRC enthusiast.
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Eggleston's readable work provides a narrative spine to the evolution of Canada's weapons research programmes. Chapters focus on radar; the proximity fuse; RDX and other explosives; atomic energy; service specific research projects (de-gauzing of ships; winterization of equipment); materials and food; and medical research. Suflfield's was a critical Canadian contribution to wartime research. Britain did not have the space for the large test areas that chemical war research required. Canada's geography proved, yet again, a tool for security. 24 Eggleston fails to mention, however, that Suffield was a joint AngloCanadian effort, and among its more important Superintendents were British scientists who had worked at Porton Down CW research establishment.
The book also describes Canada's contribution to more discrete technological developments, from the problems of the "Weasel" winter war vehicle, modified to marshland conditions and used in North West Europe, to the failed attempt to produce the bizarre, British-requested, sea-going "Ice Fortress" known as Habbakuk, 25 and many points in between. The difficulties each personality, faced within Ottawa, or with allies, or the terrible failures associated with the Royal Canadian Navy's withdrawal for service in the North Atlantic in 1943, are absent. Eggleston is, clearly, an NRC booster, and not a critic. As such, Canada's "middle power" position between their chief allies is described in positive terms of contribution, though relations were far from smooth. British concerns over Canada's intellectual and scientific ability to make meaningful contributions to allied projects, especially towards the British-pioneered radar, were real and had to be overcome. What changed such opinions was Canada's actual performance in radar and RDX production. Eggleston also touches on Canada's fight for critical resources during the period of US neutrality and British scarcity. Humbly, Eggleston argues, via a baseball analogy, that Canada's contribution was, that of ... a player who repeatedly contributes to smart fielding manoeuvres [sic] throughout the game, including participation in a couple of vital triple plays, one who gets up to bat at a critical moment and drives in a run. A player who cannot be described, of course, as the outstanding star of the game, since that honour 144
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belongs to the star pitcher, the "Babe" Ruth of the outfield, but whose assistance stands out as an essential ingredient of victory.
27
Like Kennedy, Eggleston vetted his work before his subjects. Indeed, it could not have been written without the consent of Mackenzie, Maas, and the rest of the NRC establishment, which the author also acknowledges.
28
Objective analysis and the rigor demanded by scholarly approaches to history are, if not absent, muted in the enthusiastic telling of this tale. Like Kennedy's book, it is a well of information not a foundation stone. Unlike Kennedy, it is a highly readable account of key personalities and policies of Canada's wartime science efforts.
In 1959, Captain D.J. Goodspeed published an official history of the Defence Research Board of Canada, the postwar inheritor of the NRC's defence research obligations and responsibilities. It included a brief summary of the NRC's role during the war, primarily in coordinating the nation's defence research efforts in the services, academia, and industry, and its phenomenal growth. Goodspeed also includes the defence research units of the services developed during the war and would eventually be part of the postwar Defence Research Board. 29 This last official history of science in government does not deviate from the arguments of any of the previous accounts to any great measure.
Stream II: Defence Research in Canadian Military History, 1960-1990
By the end of the 1960s, Canadian military historians were taking a keener interest in defence research. Unfortunately, this coincided with military history's decline as a field of study in Canada. As such, wartime defence research developed as a small part of the much grander picture of Canada's war effort, exemplified by John Swettenham's three-volume biography of General A.G.L. McNaughton, one of Canada^s first soldier-scientists.
McNaughton's concern and contribution to defence research throughout his prestigious career is charted. C.J. Mackenzie, who wrote the foreword, noted that McNaughton, as president of NRC between 1935 and 1944 was "twenty-five years ahead of his time in his understanding of the part applied science was to play in modern industrial technology."
30 His term as NRC president, while initially unpopular with the scientists, nonetheless laid down much of the pre-war preparations the council required to grow into the nation's principal research agency, including increasing its ties to the Department of National Defence. 31 However, with the General's hands on Swettenham's shoulder, the author rarely challenges the subject. McNaughton argued that his removal as Chief of the General Staff and appointment to president of the NRC was not, as many have suggested, a response to the unpopularity of the labour camps he had organized during the heart of the depression, but a sage and
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strategic move by then Prime Minister R.B. Bennett to prepare Canada for a future war with Germany. 32 While the verity of this argument is unsupported by documents, Swettenham demonstrated that McNaughton did organize the NRC to pursue both pure and applied science in projects that directly or indirectly had a military value: the cathode ray direction finder, photographic sciences, ballistics, optics, etc. He also initiated a chemical warfare section to develop counter-measures such as gas masks, fortuitous given the Italian use of poison gas in Abyssinia and Britain's warning that Canada had to supply their own gas masks if war came. 33 Swettenham's book remains the first attempt by a Canadian military historian dealing with the Second World War to include Canada*s defence research efforts as part pf their story. Two years after the publication of McNaughton's biography, another "official" work would lay claim to being the best overall book on Canada's war policies in the Second World War.
The only other biography of substance on wartime science is Michael Bliss's Banting. While best known as the co-discover of insulin, Sir Frederick Banting was also Canada's most popular scientist before his premature death in 1941. Like McNaughton, he feared German advances in science for a coming war in the 1930s. Banting made distinct contributions to the G-suit, and was a firm believer in research into chemical and biological weapons, though his judgment about their value as a weapon was disputed. 34 The war work of Charles Best has generated some biographies and historical analysis of Best's role in blood banks and medical science during the war, all of which were more substantial than Banting's war work. 35 In 1970, C.R Stacey published Arms, Men, and Government: The War Policies of Canada, 1939 Canada, -1945 . Stacey, Canada's preeminent military historian, took eleven years to write this definitive work, which remains the magnum opus of his career. It has yet to be surpassed in its breadth and tactful objectivity assessing the King government's confusing, often contradic-tory, yet successful war policies, including its review of defence research efforts. These largely concern the army's interest, and this focus is not surprising, since Stacey had originally intended the book to deal with the war policies affecting the army alone. 36 Stacey's work dispassionately summarizes the major research projects undertaken by the NRC, DMS, and the services' research and development units in RDX production, the GL Mark IHC radar system, as well as the chemical warfare unit at the Suffield Experimental Station and atomic research. In short, he gives à scholarly approach to the often dangerous and difficult nature of defence research and defence production that is absent or only suggested in Kennedy's and Eggleston's work, though each of these authors is used as a key source. 37 The coverage of the Anglo-Canadian 38 Stacey clearly felt the need to end his book with these efforts to fill out the spectrum of Canada's war effort. Given the book's daunting task, it is instructive that defence research efforts are included at all.
Historian Donald Avery noted that while Stacey was keen to present the contribution Canada made to defence research, evaluating its impact was difficult, if not impossible because it was just that-a contribution. It was "a share, and necessarily in most cases not a major share, in a great and complicated joint effort." 39 Historians may have taken this as a warning, as most Canadian military history on the Second World War places defence research on the periphery of their work.
Service Histories
Unfortunately, the official histories of both the RCN and the RCAF have lagged behind Stacey and his assistants' efforts with the army and the government. It is a sad tale that cannot be recounted here. 40 So, has defence research been left in the shadow of more dominant and numerous works on operations, doctrine, leadership, and the like in Canadian military history?
Emerging from the Shadows
At first glance, yes. Owen Cooke's eminently useful bibliography of Canada's military history includes many works on Canada's defence research during the Second World War, particularly those concerning radar and atomic energy, but they are not grouped together as a subject unto themselves. 41 It is not surprising, given Cooke's task, that defence research has been subsumed within larger categories. Desmond Morton's more recent and no less ambitious short work A Militaiy History of Canada echoes Cooke's approach. Defence research remains, for some military scholars, a small, constituent part of the broader fields of military and political history. 42 
Publish or Perish
With the waning popularity of national and military history in Canadian academia over the past forty years, it is no shock that defence research, as a subset of military history, has also suffered. Since 1945, few historical publications showed an interest in defence research scholarship. Canadian Historical Review featured little military history let alone articles dealing with science and technology in a military context until the late 1970s. 43 Robert Bothwell and David Zimmerman both published works on the dynamics between war needs, government action, and relationship with the business and the services. Bothwell focused on government control of uranium mining and production through their crown corporation, Eldorado. His two definitive works on Canada's role in nuclear energy that 44 Bothwell and William Kilbourn also produced the best current biography of CD. Howe, providing a personal glimpse into defence research's most important cabinet minister. 45 Zimmerman's work details the difficult and often antagonistic relationship between the NRC and Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) during the RCN's brutal experience in the Battle of the Atlantic. Zimmerman produced a major monograph on the RCN's technological challenges during.the war, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa. Unlike Eggleston, Zimmerman takes a critical stance on the relationship between state agencies such as the NRC, DMS, and Research Enterprises, Ltd., examining the NRC's failures in management and application of science on radar and sonar. C.J. Mackenzie's leadership, while still critical, is also challenged.
46 While Zimmerman's work was critiqued for some very discrete factual errors, 47 it also represents a more objective and critical view than the official histories.
Defence research has found more robust representation in more specific academic and professional journals. Canadian Military History began in 1990. While focused pn traditional military history topics, it has published . on technology and its development in war. Most of these discussions are outside the boundaries of this article, 48 but CMHhas also championed other defence research issues: for example, political accountability of the RCN's technological failings in 1943; the RCN's challenge with the role of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in the Battle of the Atlantic; and the development of the "Franks Flying Suit," used to offset the G-forces RC AF and RAF fighter pilots faced throughout the war. 49 It is hoped that this ethos continues.
Canadian Defence Quarterly (CDQ), a professional military journal, was revived after a forty-year hiatus in 1971 as the professional forum for discussing modern Canadian defence issues. Military history was always included, and until its end in 1998, CDQ contained some work of military history. Primarily a modern defence journal, CDQ maintained a distinct interest in Canadian defence research matters. 50 Greg Stewart explored Canada's initial role in jet engine creation though various Crown corporations during and after the war, and its sad decline in the wake of the Avro Arrow debacle. 51 D.A. Fraser described his own wartime recollection of the creation and use of Leigh Light in the RCAF's anti-submarine operations in the North Atlantic. 52 Historian Marc Milner offered a telling glimpse of the difficulties the RCN faced in recovering from its "technological back-wardness" during the Battle of the Atlantic, as it sought new and better asdic-sonar equipment and weapons like the British "hedgehog" mortar system to combat the U-boats. 53 The journal's 148
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professional offspring, Canadian Military Journal, has maintained this historical and defence research ethos and, hopefully, will soon publish more works that involve the two. 54 Milner's piece represents a crossover point into the next stream of this historiography. Milner, one of Canada's foremost naval historians, chose to present this piece at the Canadian Science and Technology Historical Association s annual Kingston meeting in 1989. Indeed, the burgeoning field of the history of science and technology has provided defence research scholarship a new home.
Stream III: The Growth of Canadian Science and Technology History, 1978-1990
While historical works on science and technology predate the development of these disciplines, 55 it was not until this past half century that American and then Canadian universities created programmes, departments, and journals that investigated the history of science, technology, and medicine. 56 Military topics were also examined. 57 Canada's roots in this field start at the 1972 Montreal meeting of the Canadian Historical Association (CH A), which featured, for the first time, a session on the history of Canadian science. This served as the starting point for what, in 1980, became the Canadian Science and Technology Historical Association (CSTH A). This group developed into a professional academic organization, establishing regular conferences and a peer reviewed journal, 58 Scientia Canadensis. From the outset, it published works on defence research during the Second World War. Zimmerman continued his work on the nature of technological change in the RCN, including comparative analysis with the Australian Navy wartime experience. 59 Work on wartime medical research is growing thanks to work by Canada's Alison Li and the US's Terri Romano on NRC medical work. 60 Jean-Louis Trudel has written on the war's impact on the development of professional engineering at the University of Toronto, complementing Richard White's recently published history of U of T's Faculty of Applied Science and Engineering. 61 The nation's chemicals history is also represented, including the war years, again focusing on RDX production. 62 The outrageous, controversial and, in hindsight, silly Habbakuk "ice fleet" project has also garnered more attention now that documents have been declassified. 63 There appears no indication that CSTHA will lose its interest in promoting analysis of wartime defence research.
NRC Redux
Many original CSTHA members were NRC archivists, scientists, and historians who worked on correcting the deficiencies in the NRC official histories. In 1976 archivists Bruce Marshall and Alf Ticker established the
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NRC History and Archives Project, which would include publishing books on the war work of all the major divisions. 64 Most were completed by the mid eighties, giving a much more rigorous view of all the divisions. 65 The exception, again, was the chemistry division. 66 These archivists also organized the NRC oral history series. These were taped interviews with NRC members and key scientists, including those of the war years. While unavailable for this work at time of writing, they are, by virtue of their existence, a valuable part of the defence research story, though how valuable will depend on the topic, scientists, and quality of answers provided on any of the 100 plus tapes.
In 1975 Mel Thistle, NRC member and writer, released a collection of private and formerly classified letters from C.J. Mackenzie to General McNaughton, 1939 McNaughton, -1943 . These were Mackenzie's personal attempts to keep McNaughton, still president of the NRC, informed and aware of the council's efforts. The letters were selected with the consent and help of Mackenzie himself, who contributed the introduction and epilogue. This correspondence provides a rare, if limited, look at how Mackenzie ran the NRC. He discusses the difficulties and successes in almost every major division, the strain and benefit of working with allies, the need to concentrate on projects with quick returns to aid the war effort, and a host more. Among the more engaging insights is the NRC's fight with the Civil Service Commission, whose own interests concerning labour, rather than brainpower, clashed with the NRC's need for the best minds and most skilled hands in Canada working on defence research projects. 67 Mackenzie reveals his views on topics ranging from GL radar development and the RCN, 68 alliance tension with the US and Britain regarding the perception of quality of Canadian sciences, 69 and dead-end projects such as Habbakuk, wooden plane production, and camouflage for naval vessels. 70 The letters are a valuable contribution to the history of Canadian defence research for the insight they provide on Mackenzie's thinking at the time. Zimmerman's work partially refutes the sanguine picture presented here, which is all for the good as Thistle is clearly a champion of Mackenzie. Still, these letters provide fascinating insight into Canada's wartime science management from it chief science tsar.
The saga ofNRC's chemical and biological efforts has, on the other hand, found an author outside its institution. John Bryden's Deadly Allies is the first major monograph using previously classified documents at the National Archives of Canada as well as the National Research Council to deal with the nation's chemical and biological war effort. Canada's role in creating anthrax and developing various countermeasures is told with enthusiasm. We also get new interpretations on the roles of Mackenzie, Maas, and Banting, all of which are perhaps more controversial than they needed to be. Maas is particularly cited as a figure of perhaps dubious 71 But Avery gives a readable, scholarly, and objective reading where there had only been general, popular, or controversial accounts of such efforts as the Experimental Station's chemical sprays or anthrax production facilities at Grosse île, Quebec. The critical and often obfuscated contribution of Canada's universities in defence research is also laid out in detail, particularly the chemical work done at McGill and the University of Toronto. Avery's greatest contribution is his close examination of Alliance politics, which only the Mackenzie-McNaughton wartime letters had previously emphasized. The role of successful liaison scientist in Canada, such as Sir James Chadwick with the atomic energy projects at the Montreal Lab and Chalk River, are presented as critical to Canada's successful participation in the defence research side of the war. Avery argues that Mackenzie envisioned Canada's role in atomic science going beyond the war. To do this required maintaining saliency with its allies so that Canada would maintain access to the best minds, technology, and breakthroughs in harnessing atomic power, while maintaining a focus on immediate war needs. Avery ends his work with discussion of Canada's technical-scientific relations with the Soviet Union and the impact of Soviet espionage in the defence research arena, a rather awkward way to finish his tale. 72 But that is a minor quibble. The Science of War will likely remain the decisive work in the field for some time.
Indeed, Avery's focus on the human relationships involved in defence research gives his work an accessibility often missing in defence research works. The C.J. Mackenzie presented in this work is more sanguine than Zimmerman's portrayal, but it certainly avoids some of the gloss in the NRC histories. More time is spent on the relationship with US research establishments and projects, friction and cooperation with such US science tsars as Vannevar Bush at the National Defence Research Committee (NDRC), later the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD). American work on this relationship clearly places Canada on the periphery of research endeavours, though important parts of the periphery. Avery has helped establish that for the complete story of defence research to be told, it requires a Canadian perspective.
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Stream IV: Commemoration
Modern defence research institutions, whose heritage stretches back to those war days, have taken an interest in commemorating as well as remembering these efforts since the 1970s. These works are not scholarly. But given the limited volume of resources on Canadian defence research, many provide a focus and starting.point on a series of intriguing aspects of defence research during the war
The most thorough and informative works in this stream are J.W. Mayne's four works on operational research (OR) in the three services during the Second World War, written in the early and late 1970s. Mayne, a member of the Department of Defence's Operational Research and Analysis Establishment (ORAE), originally wrote three histories of OR in the Canadian military, one for each service, in 1970. These were informal institutional histories primarily concerned with understanding how current OR units in each of the services developed. Mayne discussed the major hurtles and successes, reports and activities, that each establishment made. These documents remained classified for internal use until the early 1990s, and much of the data pertains to the postwar period, but the origins of military OR in Canada during the Second World War is covered, although with scant detail. Like Kennedy's work, it is an effort to catalogue rather than analyze the hows and whys of the services' OR efforts. 73 By 1978, Mayne had compiled these three efforts into a two-volume work, Operational Research in the Canadian Armed Forces During the SecondWorld War. This comprehensive work should serve to guide further research into the totality of military OR as it was developed and practiced in the services. 74 The RCAF OR units for both East and Western Commands were involved in developing quantitative methods of evaluating operational performances in such areas as bomb damage assessment, efficiency in attacks on U-boats, and answering issues of discrepancies in navigation logs. 75 The RCN's ORG activities were smaller than the other services, focused primarily on anti U-boat operations, including the development of countermeasures against the German's acoustic torpedo, and, at war's end, processing and communicating information gathered from prisoners taken from U-889, including information on captured German weapons and devices. 76 The army's ORGs included a gamut of activities and establishments across Canada, and no doubt the army's enthusiasm for OR activities can be attributed to McNaugton's support for such work to be done. There were ten CAORG detachments in total, five in Canada, and five overseas. The activities of the domestic CAORG detachments included cooperation with other government bodies in work ranging from entomological surveys (study of bugs and malaria) to meteorology (using radar to study weather patterns), to training staff in Morse code, gauging the quality of tanks' sight, and many more. No Day Long Enough, edited by George Lindsey and released in 1997, is both a limited and useful commemorative work. This collection of essays and reminisces of defence research efforts during the war was initiated by Lindsey in the wake of preparing a symposium to honour Dr. Omond Solandt, one of Canada's preeminent defence scientists and science organizers. 82 The success of the conference and the desire of the contributors to create more documented efforts on the role of Canadian scientists in the Second World War led to No Day Long Enough.*
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Each chapter and vignette covers some part of the vast array of projects, from the growth and financial support of the NRC during the war, to more discrete technological hurdles involved in radar development, RDX production, and the scientific and technical needs of each service. The atomic power developments and the ever-strange Habbakuk project are also covered. Portions of the work are merely abstracted from the works of Eggleston, Mayne, Longard, Goodspeed, and NRC documents, but given the status of defence research, this is not surprising. In fact, it is encouraging that an attempt was made to bring new and old material together in a rather novel form that includes two professional historians, L. W.C.S. Barnes and Bill Rawlings.
The book's greatest value is in the remembrances, such as I.E. Puddington's work in industrial chemistry to find substitutes to materials made scarce by the war, or P. W. Nasmyth's review of the difficulties the NRC faced in manufacturing their own cavity magnetron. Still, as memory serves as the key primary source here, No Day Long Enough, like the NRC histories, must be read with caution and diligence given the sources of data. The picture it presents of the NRC's conduct focuses on success and does not examine failure, and this leads to a one-sided argument that should not be taken as gospel without reading Bothwell or Zimmerman's work on similar subjects.
Conclusion
Canada emerged as a defence research power during six years of war, able to participate and contribute alongside its allies towards victory in 1945. As this historiography shows, this story has only partially been told, and many difficulties in exploring this history remain. Classified documents, difficulty of subject matter, and lack of interest have all contributed to this state. Still, the work that exists suggests that history of defence research in the Second World War is developing steam, albeit slowly, as its literature has grown since 1945.
The four streams of development, from popular and official accounts, to the parallel streams of military history and the history of science and technology, to the renewed interest of institutions in commemorative histories, have, thankfully, a forward momentum. Hopefully this momentum will help inspire others to correct some of the major holes in the historiography.
Of immediate concern is the lack of professional biographies on chief scientists of the war. McNaughton, Banting, and Best have been given historical treatment, but it will be impossible to assess the complete picture of Canada's defence research efforts without comprehensive investigations into the lives of C.J. Mackenzie, Otto Maas, John T. Henderson, E.W.R. Steacie, and others. The Department of Munitions and Supply also needs more thorough treatment than can be given in this paper. The difficulty, of course, lies in getting business and official records from private and public archives, no easy task given business's general reluctance to allow anyone access to their records without a say in the final product; the fear of writing "company histories" remains. But the activities of such bodies as Research Enterprises Limited or the Army Engineering Research Branch are vital ingredients in knowing how Canada produced relevant war machines. Again, access to records may be difficult, indeed impossible. 84 Until we have more data, we are stuck with Kennedy's assertions, which, for all we know, may be diluted, contradictory, or wrong.
The historiography of these efforts, though, has a more positive trajectory. Military history and the history of science and technology in Canada have provided forums for those with an interest in research and writing on defence research topics. The difficulties of studying defence research in Canada during the Second World War are not insurmountable. Scholars of the history of technology have created a body of literature on the critical importance of contextual factors in scientific and technological development. 85 Their emphasis on the power of personality and the influence of institutional and cultural factors in technological development may provide new tools of analysis and modes of inquiry for young students studying Canadian defence research. For instance, students might assuage the difficulty of the subject matter and create richer intellectual products on topics, like radar development at the NRC or the NRE, which have already been initiated into the field, by comparative views on service culture between Canada, Britain, and or the US. Whatever steps they take, new researchers and writers will be adding to a growing historiography that has developed from a peripheral element to a relatively new field of study, one that has grown in quality and variety through various streams of historical inquiry. 
Notes
